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Ruminations of a Trial Lawyer on Judicial Politics: An
Essay in Memory of Judge Earl E. Veron*
J. Michael Veron'"
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the first things law schools teach is that rules constitute the essence
of law.' In fact the law student is told that rules distinguish law from politics.
The mission of the law student, therefore, is to acquire and demonstrate
specialized knowledge about rules. It is the mastery of this specialized
knowledge that is the hallmark of the lawyer as a professional.
Consistent with this is the traditional view that politicians are concerned only
about outcomes, while lawyers are equally devoted to the rules that define the
process by which outcomes are reached. To oversimplify, politics is about ends,
but law is about means as well as ends. To be sure, a political outcome today
does not dictate a political outcome tomorrow. There is no stare decisis in
politics, because politics is about power, which is ephemeral. Whoever is in
power dictates political outcomes. However, law is supposed to be different.
Through rules whose existence precedes the dispute (hence the term "prece-
Copyright 1996, by LOTISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* This essay is dedicated to the memory of my father, Earl E. Veron, a 1959 graduate of the
LSU Law Center. Dad was elected to the state district bench in 1967 and served from 1968 until
1977, when he was appointed to the federal bench by President Jimmy Carter. He served as United
States District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana from that time until his death in 1990.
His judicial integrity distinguished his career, and he abhorred any intrusion of politics into the
judiciary.
** B.A. 1972, J.D. 1974, Tulane; L.L.M. 1976, Harvard. Member, Louisiana Bar. Adjunct
Professor of Law, LSU Law Center. Member of the firm of Scofield, Gerard, Veron, Singletary &
Pohorelsky, Lake Charles, Louisiana.
1. One of my first law professors, Ferd Stone, authored a wonderful little book entitled
Introduction to the Study of Law. I am indebted to him for providing such a splendid orientation to
the primacy of rules in the legal system. In addition, every law student (and lawyer, for that matter)
should read Karl Llewellyn's The Bramble Bush, which comprises lectures given to introduce
Columbia Law School students to the study of law in 1929 and 1930. According to Professor
Llewellyn,
rules are the heart of law, and the arrangement of rules in orderly coherent system is the
business of the legal scholar, and argument in terms of rules, the drawing of a neat
solution from a rule to fit the case in hand-that is the business of the judge and of the
advocate.
Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 13 (1930). Of course, to a Louisiana lawyer steeped in a civil-
law tradition whose ancestry can be traced to the Institutes of Justinian in 533 A.D., the idea that
rules are the centerpiece of any legal system is hardly new. See generally Frederick H. Lawson, A
Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law (1953); John H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition
(1969). To a true civilian, not even judge-made law qualifies as a "rule" because rules can only
come from the legislative branch of government.
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dent")," the law dictates legal outcomes irrespective of the political power of
each side to the dispute.
Consistent rule application produces consistent and predictable results. If
two cases present the same facts, one expects litigation results to be the same in
each case, regardless of the lawyers, parties, or judges involved.3 Ultimately,
therefore, the single most important criterion by which we measure the
performance of our courts and our judges is the extent to which we can predict
outcomes, i.e., the extent to which like cases produce like results.
For this reason, judges are traditionally measured by their rule-orientation.
Historically, good judges are viewed as rule-oriented rather than result-oriented.
Good judges independently reason through the rules to reach blind outcomes
rather than manipulate the rules to reach foreordained outcomes. Of course, this
is not as simple as it may seem. The process of rule application demands clarity
of thought, intellectual honesty, scholarship, and an apolitical mindset. A good
judge has no agenda other than rule application. His primary goal is to get it
"right," meaning to find the facts correctly from the evidence and to apply the
law correctly to resolve the case, regardless of whether he likes the outcome or
agrees with the policies expressed by the applicable law."
The law speaks to this in a number of ways. For example, numerous
appellate opinions warn that a court of appeal is not to substitute its judgment
for that of the trial judge merely because it disagrees with his findings.' In
2. In his classic work, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, Dean Roscoe Pound identified
twelve ideas about the nature of law, including divinely ordained rules, custom, philosophically
discovered wisdom, moral codes, democratic rules, rules developed out of commercial necessity, and
rules handed down by the will of the Emperor. All ideas presumed that the rules preceded the affairs
they governed. Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 25-30 (1922).
3. This is not a new idea, even for me. See J. Michael Veron, The Contracts Clause and the
Court: A View of Precedent and Practice in Constitutional Adjudication, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 117, 156-58
(1979).
4. This is not to say that rule-oriented judges always follow precedent. Even stare decisis
permits exceptions, but the exceptions are rare and ordinarily occur only at the highest appellate
levels. Consider the following description of the judicial process by Judge Cardozo:
The first thing [the judge] does is to compare the case before him with the precedents,
whether stored in his mind or hidden in the books. I do not mean that precedents are
ultimate sources of the law, supplying the sole equipment that is needed for the legal
armory .... None the less, in a system so highly developed as our own, precedents have
so covered the ground that they fix the point of departure from which the labor of the
judge begins.... Stare decisis is at least the everyday working rule of our law....
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 19-20 (1921). Another excellent
description of the judicial process can be found in Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal
Reasoning (1949). Except for a brief period in post-Revolutionary times, the American legal system
has followed the English theory of precedent without significant variation. See Morton J. Horwitz,
The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860, at 24-27 (1977). For an historical account of
precedent in England, see Theodore Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 324-32
(1948).
5. E.g., Lewis v. State, 654 So. 2d 311 (La. 1995); Soileau v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 406 So.
2d 182 (La. 1981); Schexnayder v. Carpenter, 346 So. 2d 196 (La. 1977).
[Vol. 56
1996] JUDICIAL POLITICS
order to overturn a lower court's findings of fact, the court of appeal must hold
that the trial judge's findings constitute an abuse of discretion, or "manifest
error," i.e., there is virtually no evidentiary support in the record.6 The
Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to be "faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence in it," prohibits them from political activities
other than participating in their own campaigns for office,8 and admonishes them
not to use their office for political ends.9 The Louisiana Codes of Civil and
Criminal Procedure provide that a judge may be recused from any case in which
he is biased, prejudiced, or interested in the outcome.' ° All of this clearly
indicates the primacy of rules over politics in the judicial system.
Beyond these expressions in the law, the art ofjudging has been the subject
of legal commentary for many years. The historical literature defines a judicial
tradition that extolls judges who stand apart from politics." However, it is only
in recent years that any real effort to evaluate the performance of individual
judges in objective terms enjoys popular support. 2 Perhaps there is a fear that
evaluating a judge's performance compromises the independence of the judiciary.
In point of fact, the contrary is true: Focusing on the extent to which a judge
applies the rules by definition rewards legal, rather than political, behavior.
This traditional view that law and politics are separate is now being
challenged. There is an increasing public perception-shared by many within the
legal profession-that power has come to mean more than rules in the legal
arena.'3 Litigation is increasingly viewed less as a civilized means by which
6. The reported cases addressing the "manifest error" rule in Louisiana (also called the "clearly
wrong" rule) are literally too numerous to count. For recent examples, see Jure v. Raviotta, 612 So.
2d 225 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So. 2d 1257 (1993); Dominici v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 606 So. 2d 555 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992); Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Holiday Inn of
Leesville, 525 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988). Critics have claimed that the "manifest error"
rule is only invoked when a reviewing court decides to affirm the lower court.
7. La. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 A(1).
8. La. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7 A.
9. La. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2 B.
10. La. Code Civ. P. art. 151(BX5); La. Code Crim. P. art. 671(1).
11. Most of the studies have focused on appellate judges, particularly the most visible, to-wit:
our Supreme Court justices. E.g., G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of
Leading American Judges (1976). At that level, the interplay of politics and law is decidedly more
philosophical than the conflict that often exists in lower courts. It is the latter variety that is the
subject of concern here.
12. Beginning in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, established professional groups such as the
American Judicature Society and the American Bar Association began endorsing proposals to survey
practicing lawyers within various jurisdictions on the performance of the judges in the area. In many
instances local bar groups conduct the surveys. In Louisiana, the New Orleans Bar Association
publishes the results of their members' evaluations of the judicial candidates seeking office. In the
absence of surveys of sitting judges by formal bar groups, several newspapers in the state (for
example, the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Lafayette Daily Advertiser, and Monroe Newstar) fill
the void by conducting surveys among local lawyers regarding judges in the area.
13. For example, two hour-long television programs addressed abuses in the legal system. The
first was aimed at abusive plaintiffs. The Blame Game: Are We Becoming a Nation of Victims?
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lawyers resolve their clients' differences and more as an excessively expensive
process in which lawyers bash one another's clients into submission (and pocket
excessive fees in the process). Under this view, lawyers are hired more for their
meanness and political clout than for their integrity and legal acumen.
There are many who believe the courts have made this possible by default.
They say that lawyers are ethically obliged to advocate their clients' positions to
the full extent they are permitted to do so and, therefore, cannot be blamed for
their zeal. Nor do these critics fault the "rules of the game," because the law
makes full provision for abuses of the legal process, from sanctions for filing
frivolous pleadings or obstructing discovery to proscriptions against the
admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.' 4 Critics who see a disparity
between the law as written and the law as fact point to poor judicial performance
as the reason. They contend that when judges fail to control litigation, the result
is not only added costs and delays to the litigants, but also confusion of issues
that affects decisions on the merits.
As Professor Malone most certainly knew, the literal definition of "ruminate"
is "to chew (the cud), as a cow does."" The intent here is to "chew on" this
blurring of the line between law and politics that seems to have developed and,
in the process, perhaps gain some insight into this troubling phenomenon.
II. JUDICIAL POLITICS
Louisiana judges are elected by popular vote. 6 That fact alone affects the
Louisiana judiciary in a number of ways. Judicial office is significantly different
(ABC television broadcast, Oct. 26, 1994). The second program more pointedly blamed lawyers for
fomenting frivolous litigation. The Trouble With Lawyers ... (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 2,
1996). Both programs portray the legal system as ineffective. The most recent issue of the ABA
Journal contains an article critical of the media for sensationalizing aberrational rulings and for taking
a "tabloid" approach to covering legal proceedings in sharp contrast to the narrative and analytical
standard set by Anthony Lewis in Gideon's Trumpet. Lincoln Caplan, Why Play-by-Play Coverage
Strikes Out for Lawyers, 82 A.B.A. J. 62 (Jan. 1996). In particular, the ABA Journal piece addresses
the issue of extending television coverage of murder trials such as those involving O.J. Simpson and
the Menendez brothers. Regardless of the media's effect on public dissatisfaction with the legal
system, it is clear that that cynicism is shared by lawyers as well. See, e.g., Gary A. Hengstler, Vox
Populi: The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, 79 A.B.A. J. 60 (Sept. 1993); What the
Members Think, 78 A.B.A. J. 60 (Nov. 1992).
14. See, e.g., La. Code Civ. P. arts. 221-227, 863, 1469-1472; La. Code Evid. arts. 401-403.
15. Webster's New World Dictionary 1245 (2d ed. 1970).
16. La. Const. art. V, § 22. It is beyond the scope of this essay to debate whether merit
appointment or popular election is the better method of selecting judges. See John H. Hill, Taking
Texas Judges Out of Politics: An Argument For Merit Election, 40 Baylor L. Rev. 339 (1988).
However, comparisons to judicial performance in the federal courts where judges are appointed for
life are inevitable. The level of performance on the federal bench is generally perceived as
significantly higher than its state counterparts (not just in Louisiana but elsewhere). By virtue of
their appointment for life, federal judges are free of any pressure to satisfy any segment of the voting
public. Their approach to their work, therefore, is unencumbered by real or imagined political
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from other political offices. Judicial offices are not representative offices (i.e.,
city councilman, police juror, or state representative). A judge's primary mission
is to administer and apply the law and not to represent the preferences of his
constituency. 7 Presumably for this reason, only lawyers can become judges. 8
People within the legal profession possess varying levels of skill and
knowledge about the law. While fellow lawyers often find these differences
among their colleagues to be rather evident, they are not often discernible to
laymen. This problem becomes most apparent in judicial elections. Campaigns
for judicial office rarely stress the professional qualifications of the candidates.
Instead, armed with public opinion polls, judicial candidates typically campaign
for office on popular political issues such as "law and order" or tort reform.
Judicial campaigns are further politicized by the great number of lawyers who
actively support various candidates, particularly with financial contributions and
often in organized groups representing their own political interests. All of this
tends to produce campaign rhetoric that generates much heat but little light on
the extent to which the candidates possess the qualities required to be a good
judge.
That is understandable. A thirty-second sound bite about victims' rights or
insurance fraud is a lot more attention-getting than an ad about a candidate's law
school grades or his knowledge of the hearsay rule. However, judges are elected
to apply the law as it exists, not to change it according to their campaign
platform under the guise of "doing justice." Thus, in the end, it is more
important to know how well a candidate understands the hearsay rule than what
his political views are about crime. Regrettably, the process of campaigning for
mandates. Moreover, it seems clear that the process of appointment to the federal bench excludes
less qualified candidates more effectively than popular elections. As this article went to press,
Louisiana Governor Mike Foster publicly announced his interest in proposing a system of merit
selection to replace the popular election of judges. The Louisiana Legislature may consider his
proposal as early as its special session in the spring of 1996. At any rate, the focus of this essay is
on judicial performance in state courts.
17. Over the past several years, numerous suits have been brought in federal courts in a number
of states alleging that the method of electing judges in those states violates the Voting Rights Act
of 1965. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). See Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas, 501
U.S. 419, 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991); see, e.g., Cousin v. McWherter, 46 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995);
Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (1 1th Cir. 1994); League of United Latin Am. Citizen v. Clements,
999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Magnolia Bar Ass'n v. Lee, 994 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1993).
In the Clements case, the Fifth Circuit held that the state of Texas has a substantial state interest in
the "linkage" between coterminous electoral and jurisdictional boundaries for its trial judges. Hence,
it rejected a claim that Texas' historical practice of setting the jurisdictional and electoral geographic
boundaries of its judicial districts along the same lines results in unlawful racial discrimination. In
the course of its opinion, the court recognized that linking jurisdictional and electoral boundaries
effectively promotes a state's legitimate interest in maintaining a judiciary fully capable of performing
the tasks that judges must perform. 999 F.2d at 871-75. Thus, the court's reasoning effectively
recognized that the trial judge's primary duty is to perform judicial tasks, not represent the political
interests of any segment of the population.
18. La. Const. art. V, § 24; see also La. R.S. 13:1873 (1983).
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elective judicial office has the effect of politicizing the candidates, and newly-
elected judges often enter office burdened with perceived political mandates that
may be at odds with their real mission.
For these reasons, any efforts within the profession to identify good judges
are laudable. All sitting judges benefit by knowing the ways in which they can
improve their performance. Judges who perform well are rewarded by objective
validation of their performance. Anything that makes it easier to identify good
judges makes all judges more accountable and raises the level of debate in
judicial campaigns.
III. PROFILE OF A GOOD TRIAL JUDGE
Trying a case before a good trial judge is perhaps the best experience the
legal profession can offer a lawyer. 9 In the hands of a dedicated and talented
judge, the trial of a lawsuit is a civilized mechanism to resolve disputes with
dignity. With a steady hand at the helm, a trial moves with deliberate speed,
neither rushing to judgment nor wasting unneeded motion. Lawyers fortunate
enough to find themselves before one of these trial masters know that the rules
are certain and apply equally to both sides. There is a sense of order in
proceedings conducted by a good trial judge that epitomizes the essence of law.
Unfortunately, the procedural and evidentiary laws that regulate trials are not
self-executing. Litigation is heavily dependent on the ability and will of the trial
judge. Without a firm, steady, and enlightened hand, the trial of a lawsuit can
exude all the dignity of a professional wrestling match. Nature abhors a vacuum
and fundamentally so do trial lawyers. When a judge does not take control of
the courtroom, the lawyers will vie to do so. When that happens, the experience
is unpleasant and professionally embarrassing.
If asked, nearly every trial lawyer could quickly recite the qualities that
distinguish a good trial judge. First is his level of preparation. Like good
lawyers, good judges prepare. They come to trial knowing the issues and the
positions of the parties. The second benchmark of a good trial judge is his
mastery of the two areas of law that define his art: procedure and evidence.2°
19. The following observations are drawn from my own experiences as an active trial lawyer for
20 years as well as those of numerous members of the Bar. Although I cannot prove this
conclusively, I doubt there is any real dispute among experienced trial lawyers about what makes a
good judge. The various newspaper polls described supra note 12 consistently rank judges similar
to those described above near the top of each poll regardless of locality. This suggests a strong
professional consensus on the issue. The preparation of this essay reminds me of some of the
talented trial judges before whom I have been blessed to practice in state courts. The lessons I
learned from them inspired much of what appears here. Unfortunately, in the process I am also
reminded of some of their less talented colleagues before whom I appeared and of what a difficult
labor trying cases before them could be. Those experiences, too, find expression in the text.
20. The procedures for trying civil cases are generally set forth in the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure, while the procedures for trying criminal cases are described in the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure. The evidentiary rules for all proceedings, whether civil or criminal, are provided
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A good judge does not prejudge the final result, but he knows how to get there.
The substantive rules of decision may change from case to case and in any event,
can be briefed and studied outside the heat of battle when preparing jury
instructions or the judge's opinion. The questions that must be decided on a
moment's notice in the middle of trial are procedural and evidentiary. As a rule,
it is simply not feasible to delay trials to research these questions. Objections
to an opponent's trial methods or evidence must be ruled upon when made. A
good judge can do so because he has a command of the procedural and
evidentiary rules that govern trials. The third benchmark of a good trial judge
is a product of his preparation and his knowledge: It is his ability to identify the
critical issues to be tried and to mark out the boundaries of relevance pertaining
to them. The final quality common to good judges is consistency. When
lawyers refer to good judicial temperament, they are not describing personality,
but rather the ability to maintain logical consistency when applying procedural
and evidentiary rules throughout a trial. Simply put, in the hands of a good
judge, the boundaries of relevance do not move.
IV. THE JUDGE'S IMPACT
While judges may perform well regardless of the quality of the lawyering
before them, the reverse is not true. The performance of lawyers is markedly
affected by the manner in which the judge conducts the trial. A judge whose
evidentiary rulings (particularly those relating to relevance) have the consistency
of a Ouija Board makes the trial a moving target for both sides. Moreover,
lawyers are more likely to test blurred boundaries than those marked with bright
lines. Probative evidence relating to the real issues can be forgotten when
lawyers are allowed to present prejudicial evidence that inflames more than
illuminates.2 Evidentiary objections become imprecise orations on "fairness"
that are in reality closing arguments given in bursts. To make matters worse,
one counsel's license with a judge's lax rules inevitably provokes his opponent
to do the same. Soon, the lawyers are speaking more than the witnesses, which
is a certain sign that the trial has lost its focus.
A good trial judge understands that trial lawyers have no self-restraint,
primarily because their role as advocates discourages it. For that reason, he
announces and enforces the evidentiary and procedural law of the case from the
outset. He draws bright lines around what is relevant to the case and keeps them
for in the Louisiana Code of Evidence. The Louisiana Code of Evidence is, with few exceptions,
identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
21. Evidence must be relevant in order to be admissible. La. Code Evid. art. 402. In order to
be relevant, evidence must have a tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence
to the lawsuit more or less probable. La. Code Evid. art. 401. Irrelevant evidence is never
admissible. La. Code Evid. art. 402. Relevant evidence may nonetheless be excluded if it is likely




in place. During the taking of evidence, he allows the lawyers to ask questions
and to make objections, but not to give speeches. He allows argument only
when he asks for it. He forces counsel to stay focused on the issues and the
evidence as he moves the case to its conclusion without distraction and
confusion.
This judicial "ripple effect" indicates that much of the effort at law reform
and the improvement of trial advocacy might be more productive if it were
focused on the performance of our judges. A recent statewide public opinion
poll reveals that Louisianians have as much, if not more, confidence in juries
doing justice than in judges.' Given that Louisianians elect their judges, but
must trust blind luck for their juries, this finding is rather startling. It suggests,
at a minimum, that the politicization of the Louisiana judiciary has not gone
unnoticed. Baldly put, the poll is strong evidence that the public believes that
people off the street are more likely to be impartial than someone trained and
experienced in the law who was specifically chosen to be a judge by a majority
of the voters in his district. If so, this is another strong indication that the
involvement of lawyers in judicial campaigns has compromised the perceived
independence of the judiciary. More than one recent campaign for the bench
was successfully predicated on a candidate's promise not to take financial
contributions from lawyers. The message seems to be clear: People believe that
judges are influenced by lawyers, and they do not like it.
V. PUTING LAW ABOVE POLITICS
The answer to regaining public trust in the judiciary lies in our judicial
tradition.23 Good judges always separate law from politics. They do so by
accepting the responsibility to apply the law regardless of the outcomes it
produces. In so doing, they control the litigation and the lawyers that appear
before them. A judge who allows himself to be politicized surrenders this
control. When he does, he separates himself from an historical tradition rooted
deep in the public consciousness. That tradition holds that judges occupy an
independent branch of government that is removed from the partisan politics of
the executive and legislative branches. It is no historical accident that becoming
22. According to an Associated Press report, 48% of voters polled said they have considerable
or complete confidence injuries, while only 46% said they have the same confidence in their elected
judges. Lake Charles American Press, Jan. 6, 1996, at B.
23. Professor Archibald Cox has described the importance of maintaining public confidence in
the legal system in these compelling words:
The most important quality of law in a free society is the power to command acceptance
and support from the community so as to render force unnecessary, or necessary only
upon a small scale against a few recalcitrants. I call this quality the "power of
legitimacy" because it appears to attach to those commands of established organs of
government which are seen to result from their performance in an authorized fashion of
the functions assigned to them. Such commands, and only such, are legitimate.
Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 103 (1976).
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a new judge is described as "ascending to the bench." This is merely a more
elegant way of saying that a lawyer is expected to rise above politics when he
becomes a judge.
It is said that there are no new ideas, just old ones that are forgotten and
rediscovered. This "rumination" has brought us full circle to the realization that
restoring public and professional confidence in the legal system requires no
radical innovation but instead, a return to a judicial tradition that distinguishes
law from politics.

